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Abstract—While the techniques to achieve secure, privacy-
preserving software are now well understood, evidence shows 
that many software development teams do not use them: they 
lack the ‘security maturity’ to assess security needs and decide 
on appropriate tools and processes; and they lack the ability to 
negotiate with product management for the required resources. 
This paper describes a measuring approach to assess twelve 
aspects of this security maturity; its use to assess the impact of a 
lightweight package of workshops designed to increase security 
maturity; and a novel approach within that package to support 
developers in resource negotiation. Based on trials in eight 
organizations, involving over 80 developers, this paper 
demonstrates that (1) development teams can notably improve 
their security maturity even in the absence of security 
specialists; and (2) suitably guided, developers can find effective 
ways to promote security to product management. Empowering 
developers to make their own decisions and promote security in 
this way offers a powerful grassroots approach to improving the 
security of software worldwide. 
Keywords—Developer Centered Security; software security; 
software developer; intervention; Design Based Research 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Software security and privacy are now major issues: 
almost every day we hear that several more organisations’ 
software systems have been compromised [26]. 
While there are many aspects to an organization’s security 
and privacy, the design and implementation of the software 
used clearly has a significant impact on whether such breaches 
happen. Two industry trends contribute to this: the increasing 
use of microservices and Software as a Service (SaaS) 
components, and the DevOps movement both mean that 
security must be ‘in the code’ rather the responsibility of a 
separate operations team. So, it is vital that developers be 
effective at creating secure software.  
Unfortunately, there is evidence that developers are not 
delivering this security. A recent report from Veracode 
concluded that “more than 85 percent of all applications have 
at least one vulnerability in them; more than 13 percent of 
applications have at least one very high severity flaw” [32]. A 
report from Microsoft found that 28% of Software as a Service 
applications were not supporting data encryption [23]. 
Clearly, industry practices are not yet sufficient to provide the 
software security and privacy we need. So, how can one 
support developers to deliver better security? 
This research project addresses the objective of defining a 
cost-effective intervention to support software development 
teams in creating secure products and services. In earlier 
work the authors identified requirements and an approach 
using workshops to sensitize developers to the importance of 
security [36]. Based on this they derived a set of requirements 
for this package (Section III) and concluded the need for 
objective assessment of its impact. 
The primary research question of this paper, therefore, is: 
RQ 1 What aspects of an intervention to a software 
development team are effective at improving security, 
and why? 
The paper describes the design of a security-improving 
intervention, its use in 8 different organizations, and the 
practical and theoretical conclusions. The analysis looked for 
and quantified improvements in ‘assurance techniques’: 
process improvements, understanding and skills that would 
generate better security in the longer term. The research makes 
the following contributions: 
• An existence proof that a simple ‘intervention package’ 
structured as a facilitated series of workshops can 
improve the security of software developed by a team. 
• Identification of the importance of representing security 
enhancements in terms of their business benefit, and the 
ability of developers to do so. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section II discusses 
relevant past research; section III describes and explains the 
intervention package; section IV describes the research 
method; section V explores the outcomes from using the 
intervention with different groups; section VI discusses the 
results; and section VII provides a conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Research related to interventions for secure software has 
taken a variety of approaches: ways to get developers to adopt 
process improvements; ways to get developers to adopt 
analysis tools; consultancy and training interventions; 
motivating developers to improve their processes; and 
motivating employees more generally to adopt secure 
practices. The following sections explore these approaches. 
A. Adoption of Security-Enhancing Activities 
One way to improve development security is to build a 
process around it using a ‘Secure Development Lifecycle’ 
(SDL), a prescriptive set of instructions to managers, 
developers and stakeholders on how to add security activities 
to the development process [39].  However, research suggests 
resistance from development teams to adopting a prescriptive 
methodology. For example Conradi and Dybå deduced in a 
survey that developers are skeptical about adopting the formal 
routines found in traditional quality systems [10]. 
Van der Linden et al. found from a task-based study and 
survey that developers tend to see only the activity of writing 
code to be security-relevant, suggesting a need for a stronger 
focus on the tasks and activities surrounding coding [20]. 
Caputo et al. concluded from three case studies a need for the 
alignment of security goals with business goals [8]. And an 
interview survey by Xie et al. suggests that developers make 
security errors from treating security as “someone else’s 
problem”  [42]. 
Such et al. defined a taxonomy of twenty assurance 
techniques from a survey of security specialists, finding wide 
variations in the perceived cost-effectiveness of each [30]. 
Weir et al. surveyed successful app developers, finding less 
than half using assurance techniques regularly [37]. 
This suggests a need for ways to encourage adoption. 
Indeed, recently Assal and Chiasson identified from a 
developer survey “a need for new, lightweight best practices 
that take into account the realities and pressures of 
development” [1].  
B. Encouraging the Adoption of Tools 
Witschey et al. concluded from an interview survey that 
more experienced and more inquisitive developers are more 
likely to adopt tools Key deterrents were the difficulty of 
trialling new tools and that developers are unlikely to notice a 
colleague using one [40]. Xiao et al. found from a similar 
survey that the main reasons for adoption were 
recommendation by trusted peers, including experts in 
discussion forums; or company policies mandating the use of 
such tools [41].  
Bessey et al. describe the motivation and issues with 
adopting code checkers for large codebases; for example that 
a tool “needs to deliver a true defect in its first three error 
messages” to generate a sale [6].  
C. Consultancy and Training Interventions  
Türpe et al. explored the effect of a single penetration 
testing session and workshop on 37 members of a large 
geographically-dispersed project. The results were not 
encouraging; the main reason was that the workshop 
consultant highlighted problems without offering much in the 
way of solutions [31]. A study by Poller et al. followed an 
unsuccessful attempt “to challenge and teach [the 
developers] about security issues of their product”, finding 
that pressure to add functionality meant that attention was not 
given to security issues, and that normal work procedures did 
not support security goals. The authors concluded that 
successful interventions would need “to investigate the 
potential business value of security, thus making it a more 
tangible development goal”  [25]. 
Considering book-based interventions, Yskout et al. tested 
if ‘security patterns’ might be an effective intervention to 
improve secure development in teams of student software 
developers. The results suggested a benefit but were 
statistically inconclusive [43]. A recent book by Bell et al. 
provides practical support for developers and tool 
recommendations [5]. 
D. Motivating Change in Development Teams 
Looking at ways to motivate change in development 
teams, Dybå concluded from a quantitative survey that 
organizational factors were as least as important as technical 
ones: actions need to be aligned with business goals; and that 
employees take responsibility for the changes [12]. Beecham 
et al. conducted a literature review of 92 papers on 
programmer motivation in 2008, concluding that professional 
programmers are motivated most by problem solving, by 
working to benefit others and by technical challenges [4]. Hall 
et al. framed these as intrinsic motivators, relating them to 
self-determination theory [17].  
Lopez et al. concluded that to encourage developer teams 
in doing security there is a need to “raise developers’ security 
awareness” [21], such as by using discussions about security 
[22]. 
E. Conclusions 
This previous work suggests a need for lightweight, cost-
effective, enhancements to development practices to improve 
security. In particularly, it suggests raising a development 
team’s security awareness, and aligning their security goals 
with business goals. 
III. THE INTERVENTION 
The purpose of the project was defining a cost-effective 
intervention to support software development teams in 
creating secure products and services. Prior work by the 
authors identified the following requirements for such an 
intervention: 
• Motivate developers to drive their own security 
improvements [36]; 
• Encourage developers to adopt a subset of key assurance 
techniques, specifically Threat Assessment, 
Configuration Review, Automated Static Analysis, 
Source Code Review, and Penetration Testing [36];  
• Work without security specialists, since few teams have 
access to them [37]; 
• Support developers currently using few or no Assurance 
Techniques, since few use them [37]; and 
• Work with teams, as a majority of developers do so [29] 
The authors had expected such an intervention to take the 
form of a website, a book or video [38]; or possibly a code 
analysis tool [24]. In practice, we found that excellent 
implementations already exist of such interventions, but the 
need for improved security remains. Instead, we determined 
that facilitated workshops with the teams would offer a good 
approach, and that two Assurance Techniques are suitable for 
such workshop sessions: 
• Incentivization Session, and 
• Threat Assessment 
Based on early trials of a workshop-based intervention 
[36] we concluded two further requirements: 
• To make the intervention scalable to many teams, non-
researchers must lead the intervention, and 
• A need for training to help developers promote security 
mitigations to product management 
A. Implementing the Incentivization Session 
As an alternative to traditional fear-based security 
motivation, we wanted an Incentivization Session that would 
help developers engage with security better and lose their fear 
of it. We used a facilitated game, the ‘Agile App Security 
Game’ [35], in which participants work in groups as product 
managers, selecting security-enhancing product 
improvements with varying costs and learning whether their 
choices deter attacks.  
B. Implementing Threat Assessment 
The Threat Assessment workshop was challenging to 
implement. Though valuable, normal Threat Modelling 
approaches [28] require considerable knowledge of possible 
technical threats and preferably support from a professional 
with a detailed understanding of both the industry sector and 
current cyber threats to it; neither were available. 
Instead we used a lightweight method, using an ideation 
session [14] in which a facilitator writes down unfiltered 
suggestions from the group of possible threat actors and 
outcomes (this was later replaced by an approach involving 
participants creating post-it notes with that content). 
Following that, participants used colored dots to vote, 
separately, on the most likely and the most impactful threats. 
C. Facilitator Training 
We trained one or two facilitators from each organisation, 
and they then managed the intervention. 
To motivate the developers, we encouraged the use of 
‘self-actualization’ language and approaches rather than 
commands and formal processes [15], avoiding terms like 
“you must” or “it’s essential that”. Though the researchers 
participated in the workshops, they provided only 
occasionally comments and stories as participants.  
We encouraged the facilitator to discuss, when opportunity 
arose, the other key techniques identified in the requirements 
in Section III: Configuration Review, Automated Static 
Analysis, Source Code Review, and Penetration Testing.  
D. Security Sales 
In this workshop participants split into groups, and each 
group addressed a different threat from the most important 
five or so identified in the Threat Assessment. We made the 
task approachable for developers by avoiding discussion of 
‘selling’ or ‘persuasion’, two activities that do not form part 
of a normal development role. The instruction for the 
participants was to take one of the key threats and “work out 
positive ways in which addressing that threat will benefit the 
organisation”.  
Each group discussed the threat they had chosen and wrote 
notes on a whiteboard or flipchart page. A representative from 
each group then presented their conclusions to the other 
participants. 
E. Intervention Schedule 
Figure 1 shows a typical schedule for the interventions, 
with different colors showing different sets of participants. 
The work with each group spanned 3-4 months, with only two 
days on site at the start and end. The involvement time was 
limited to four months in order to get the feedback from the 
exit interviews reasonably quickly. An online book, video, and 
materials [34] supported the package.  
IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
Trialling this intervention with professional developers 
required the involvement of the researchers both to train the 
facilitators and to support the workshops. We considered 
using Action Research [11], an accepted methodology used in 
many forms of academic social research including software 
engineering [27]. However, Action Research methodologies 
are designed to focus on the clients, following one or more 
clients through repeated research cycles. Here, by contrast, we 
were focused on the intervention, and the clients changed 
between research cycles. Accordingly, we used a different 
methodology, Design-Based Research (DBR). This supports 
different participants in each cycle of trials and focusses on 
designing an artifact. 
DBR has its roots, and is used most, in education research. 
Its foundation lies in the ‘Design Experiments’ of Brown [7], 
and Collins [9] working with teachers as co-experimenters. It 
emphasizes the development of design theory in parallel with 
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the creation of teaching innovations. DBR is now an accepted 
research paradigm, used to develop improvements ranging 
from tools to curricula [18], with a recent guide book for 
practitioners [2]. 
The characteristics of Design-Based Research [33] are that 
it is: pragmatic in that DBR aims to solve current real-world 
problems, by creating and trialling interventions in parallel 
with the creation of theory; grounded in the practicalities of 
real-world trials in the “buzzing, blooming confusion of real-
life settings” [3]; interactive, iterative and flexible with an 
iterative process involving multiple trials and experiments 
taking place as the theory develops; integrative in that DBR 
practitioners may integrate multiple methods, and vary these 
over time [33]; and contextual in that results depend on the 
context of the real-world trials. 
A. Practical Design-Based Research 
Figure 2, based on Ejersbo et al. [13], shows our 
understanding of the two parallel cycles of DBR research, 
creating theory and creating the artefact, with appropriate 
interactions between the cycles.  
The practical aspects of carrying out DBR are defined by 
the ‘integrative’ nature of DBR: both design and assessment 
techniques must come from other research methodologies 
[33]. In this project we used the techniques of the Canonical 
Action Research method [11]—though not that method’s 
overriding paradigm.  
B. Research Questions 
The DBR method requires separate research questions for 
the Design Practice cycle and the Design Theory cycle. 
Accordingly, we broke down the main research question RQ 1 
into sub-questions. Our first Design Practice question was a 
measurement of the workshops’ effectiveness: 
RQ 2 To what extent did the groups learn about and adopt 
different security-enhancing activities as a result of 
intervention? 
The second Practice question asks in what situations the 
intervention is likely to be most useful: 
RQ 3 How does the impact of the intervention vary with 
different company sizes, facilitation styles, security 
expertise, and kinds of participants? 
Turning to Design Theory questions, the suggestion from 
previous research, of the benefit of “training to help 
developers promote security mitigations to product 
management” was unproven, and so needed testing: 
RQ 4 Can having developers consider the positive benefits 
of security and privacy mitigations lead to security 
improvements in the development process? 
Colleagues had suggested that developers would require 
classroom training of techniques for risk assessment and 
‘sales’. For these workshops we had assumed this was not the 
case, though we had no a-priori justification for that: 
RQ 5 Can teams of developers produce both adequate risk 
and impact assessments and benefit analyses with 
minimal guidance? 
C. Methodology Implementation 
We recruited groups in 8 different organizations, with 
whom we carried out the intervention. First, we interviewed a 
selection of the future participants to establish a baseline in 
terms of their current understanding, practice and plans. We 
then trained the facilitators, who led the intervention 
workshops, and supported the follow-up sessions. About three 
months from the start, we carried out ‘Exit Interviews’ with 
the same participants as before. Both Entry and Exit 
Interviews were semi-structured using open questions.  
We recorded the audio of all the interviews and all the 
workshops, then transcribed the interviews. In an iterative 
process, two authors coded the interview transcripts using the 
tool NVivo. Differences in coding were discussed and 
resolved between us. 
For the coding scheme, we identified a list of security-
improving activities, including Assurance Techniques such as 
Pen Testing, and activities such as Contingency Planning, 
Training, and Stakeholder Negotiation; plus Adoption Levels 
for each (see Table 1). We were careful to distinguish changes 
due to the interventions from those due to other external 
factors; we did not code the latter. 
From the coding, we determined the maximum Adoption 
Level coded for each Assurance Technique for each group, 
both ‘before’ and ‘after’ the intervention. Our ‘Inter-Rater 
Reliability’ calculations used Krippendorff’s Alpha [16] to 
compare the Adoption Levels calculated from the coding of 
each coder rather than comparing the coding itself. 
 













TABLE 1: ADOPTION LEVELS FOR EACH ASSURANCE TECHNIQUE 
No mention No reference to it in the interview 
Aware The team showed knowledge of it. 
Planned Existing plans to incorporate it. 
Using The team have used it. 
Established The team use it in each new project. 
 
This project was approved by the Lancaster University 
Faculty of Science and Technology Research Ethics 
committee.  
V. RESULTS 
Eight interventions were carried out with a total of 88 
developers in eight different organizations, generating 21 
hours of interview audio; and 47 hours of audio from training, 
workshop and follow-up sessions. The final code book 
contained 2859 references to 51 codes. 
The Krippendorff’s Alpha metric after the first round of 
coding was 0.18, indicating only slight agreement [16]. The 
main cause was that the interviewees had not been asked 
explicitly about their use of assurance techniques, in order to 
avoid bias in the responses. This allowed several kinds of 
discrepancy between the interpretations of the two coders.  
Following a detailed discussion, the coders independently 
recoded the interviews; the resulting Krippendorff’s Alpha 
was 0.46: moderate agreement. This is as good as can 
reasonably be expected, given the need for interpretation of 
the text by the coders. The remaining discrepancies were 
mainly due to omissions by one or other coder, so we used the 
union of both sets of codings for the later analysis. 
A. Summary of Participating Groups 
The participant groups were recruited opportunistically 
through industry contacts, university outreach and conference 
presentations. Groups are identified with a letter, starting with 
D (since three organizations had been involved in early trials); 
individual members we interviewed are identified using the 
team letter and a number: ‘D1’. All of the developers 
interviewed were male, as were all managers and testers; three 
product managers were female: these numbers are consistent 
with industry norms [29].   
 Figure 3 visualizes the groups, plotting the organization 
sizes (from F’s 20 to K’s 15,000) against an estimate of their 
‘secure software capability maturity’ [19] based on the 
groups’ discussions during the workshops. Ring sizes show 
the number of participants (3 in F to 16 in K); ring centers 
show the facilitators; colors and lowercase letters show the job 
roles.  
B. Practical Results 
Table 2 shows the full list of Techniques derived from the 
coding. Horizontal lines divide them into three categories: 
Vulnerability Finding (top) to find specific vulnerabilities in 
created software; Process Improvements to create an 
environment to better support the creation of secure code; and 
Education (bottom) to teach participants and stakeholders. 
Table 3 shows the anonymized details of the organizations 
involved, the groups we worked with, and the key outcomes 
from each intervention.  
We encouraged facilitators to use their own facilitation styles, 
and saw a variety of such styles in the workshops. The 
Security Specialists, E1 J1 and J2 used a ‘dominant’ style, in 
which they and one or two others did most of the talking; in 
groups D, F, G and H there was a ‘Listening’ style, in which 
one facilitator controlled sessions, but encouraged wide 
participation. Finally, groups I and K had a ‘Peer’ style, setting 
only the workshop structure and letting the teams work 
independently  
 




































TABLE 2: ASSURANCE TECHNIQUES 
Automated Pen. Testing Using an automated tool to look for common vulnerabilities in a website or web service.  
Automated Static Analysis Using automated tools to look for common vulnerabilities in source or binary code. 
Configuration Review Choosing secure components and frameworks, and keeping them up to date 
Code Review Scheduled meetings or pair programming to analyse code for security defects 
Penetration Testing Having a security specialist look for vulnerabilities accessible via the web. 
Threat Assessment Design-level analysis of possible attackers, motives, and vulnerability locations. 
Product Negotiation Empowering product management to make security decisions. 
Contingency Plan The advance creation of a plan to handle security incidents. 
Security Champion Assigning a development team member, not usually a security expert, with a particular interest in 
security as the go-to person for security issues within the development team.  
Standardisation The creation of standard security configurations, ways of working, or ‘Secure Development 
Lifecycles’, plus auditing processes to validate these. 
On-the-job Training Mentoring or informal workshops, used regularly with the development team 
Further Workshops Using the entire package with other teams, the same team in a new project, or new members. 
 
By assigning ordinal ratings to the engagement levels as 
shown in Table 1, we calculated an indication of the ‘Impact’ 
of the intervention—the  extent to which the intervention 
affected the group’s use of the technique. Of course, this 
‘Impact’ calculation is merely an indication: a two-unit Impact 
(change in engagement) might be from No Mention to 
Planned, or from Planned to Established; these changes are not 
semantically equivalent.  
Figure 4 thus provides an answer to RQ 2 “To what extent 
did the groups learn about and adopt different security-
enhancing activities as a result of intervention?” The size of 
TABLE 3: ORGANIZATIONS, GROUPS AND KEY OUTCOMES 
 Organisation Team Threat Sales Outcomes Main Outcomes 
D A project team within a 
university, funded by a 
government grant to promote 
business innovation by 
developing proof of concept 
(PoC) applications.   
Aware of the importance of 
software security but had 
little practical knowledge; 
worked on several different 
projects at a time. 
Identified that the threat 
and risk assessment itself 
was a valuable asset to 
their clients 
Identified need to support their 
clients in identifying security 
issues when the clients came to 
implement applications based 
on the PoCs. 
E A government department 
delivering software for 
sensitive government 
applications. The group 
worked on a high-
confidentiality product. 
Less experienced than 
average for the industry, 
though the session leader 
E1 is an experienced 
security specialist  
Realized that while every 
security enhancement was 
essential, the ordering of 
their implementation could 
be altered to suit the client. 
Improved understanding in the 
team of the importance of 
Threat Assessment and 
Product Negotiation. 
F A small surveying company 
delivering a Geographical 
Information System product 
and related services. 
A previous developer had 
implemented some security 
aspects; the current team 
had little knowledge. 
‘Lined up’ security 
improvements to be 
incorporated in the 
enhancements when new 
clients wanted them 
Fixed several security issues in 
customer handling and created 
a list of issues which were later 
used as the basis for a new 
customer engagement to fix 
the following year. 
G A web applications developer 
delivering a wide variety of 
applications for clients.  
The two leads G1 and G2 
were expert in software 
security but were expected 
to provide costly security 
enhancements ‘free’. 
Found an impressively 
simple way to discuss 
security cost-benefit with a 
client: gold level hosting, 
silver and bronze security.  
Incorporated new way to 
discuss security with 
customers. G1 later expanded 
it to five options to include 
other aspects of security. 
H A small company selling a 
range of Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices and their 
associated infrastructure.  
The group justifiably 
consider themselves good 
at software security; 
Identified that their 
security story was a major 
Unique Selling Point 
against competitors. 
Following the workshop, they 
plan further training. 
I A well-established company 
providing the infrastructure for 
a commodity trading. Planning 
move from perimeter security 
to cloud-based services.   
The company has 
considerable internal 
expertise in security, 
especially I2. However, the 
developers were less 
experienced. 
Subsequently included 
security requirements in 
discussions with new 
clients 
Following the initial 
workshops, they re-ran both 
Threat Assessment and Threat 
Sales workshops to gain a 
more complete idea of the 
threats and impact on 
customers. They also ran 
workshops with further 
development teams. 
J A well-established large 
company providing web 
interfaces for retailers. The 
particular group involved had 
the responsibility of creating 
tools and services to support 
deployment  
The group was a team of 
about a dozen creating 
deployment tools and 
included security 
specialists J1 and J2. 
Devised several 
functionality and process 
improvements for their 
(internal) customers 
While some of the participants 
may well have learned from 
the workshops there were no 
detected improvements in 
understanding and technique 
use.  
K A well-established company 
with a few hundred employees 
creating tools for developers.  
 
The group has a strong 
emphasis on agile 
development processes, 
and team interaction. All 
the participants were 
developers. 
Each of four subgroups 
delivered a convincing 
sales pitch for a security 
improvement. 
Analysis showed an increase 
in awareness in the teams of 
some of the assurance 
techniques. 
 
each bubble indicates the final engagement level after the 
intervention; the color shows the change attributed to the 
intervention: amber for a change of 1 to 2 levels; red for 3 to 
4 levels.  
As the figure shows, the use of Threat Assessment and 
Product Negotiation had dramatically improved in a majority 
of groups; use of Penetration Testing and Use of Checklists 
were not affected at all. Group J showed little change as a 
result of the intervention; all the others did see at least some 
changes. Groups I, J chose to carry out further workshops 
independently from the researchers, and D, E, F, G and I all 
showed major improvements in their use of Threat Assurance 
and Product Negotiation. 
C. Technique Adoption by Different Categorizations of 
Group 
Turning to RQ 3 “How does the impact of the intervention 
vary with different company sizes, facilitation styles, security 
expertise, and kinds of participants?”, Table 4 calculates 
average impact values for different categorizations of the 
groups. The deeper shadings show the higher values in each 
categorization; the red-green colors distinguish different 
categorizations. The shading in the first column delineates the 
types of assurance technique (Vulnerability Finding, Process 
Improvements, and Training), while the figures on the bottom 
line show the average increment over all assurance techniques 
for each category. 
D. Positive Benefits of Security and Privacy 
To address the theory-based research question RQ 4 “Can 
having developers consider the positive benefits of security 
and privacy mitigations lead to security improvements in the 
development process?”, we looked for cases where the Threat 
Sales activity lead to ‘security improvements in the 
development process’. 
Group D identified in the Threat Sales discussion that the 
threat and risk assessment itself was a valuable asset to their 
clients as part of their proof-of-concept developments. They 
now incorporate a security discussion in their ‘handover 
document’ for every project they do: 
Now, after the workshop I think it was, we 
redesigned our handover template, which is 
where we now have a specific section for 
security [in every release]  (D4) 
Group F realized that they could ‘line up’ security 
improvements to be incorporated in the enhancements when 
new clients wanted them: 
Yes, .. we have picked up some new contracts, 
and … they will require us to implement pretty 
much everything that we had listed… (F1) 
Group G identified the ‘Gold, Silver, Bronze’ approach to 
selling security enhancement costs to their clients. 
To make that process a lot simpler for our sales 
team, [G1] did a lot of the leg work and setting 
up a Gold, Silver and Bronze package to say 
“right, answer these 10 questions”, and then … 
this is the package that you need'. (G6) 
Group I subsequently included security requirements in 
discussions with new clients: 
So, we are giving the Product Owners some 
more insight into why you would do this stuff, 
and where the value is. (I1) 
While we do not have evidence that the Threat Sales 
activity generated value in every case, the experience of 
Groups D and F, in particular, indicate that the activity of 
getting developers to consider the positive benefits of security 
 
FIGURE 4: CHANGES IN ASSURANCE TECHNIQUE USAGE FOR ALL GROUPS 
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can help get resources allocated to security improvements. We 
conclude, therefore, that the answer to RQ 4 is yes. 
E. Skills Not Associated with Developers 
Considering the second theory-based research question 
RQ 5 “Can teams of developers produce both adequate risk 
and impact assessments and benefit analyses with minimal 
guidance?”, we found that, surprisingly, none of the teams 
had any trouble with risk assessment. Even Group D, who are 
producing proof of concept apps for companies and are not 
therefore domain experts for their products, had little 
difficulty: 
We’ve identified huge risks that they need to 
consider before they ever get anywhere near an 
actual working product. (Participant, Group D) 
Team E learned and took away the prioritization process: 
We had a follow-on session afterwards where 
we took everything away, … and sat down and 
thought “what do we need to do next”. (E3) 
For Group F, F1 produced a table of risks and impacts 
based on their discussion. Group G had no problem with risk 
assessments, since G1 and G2 were familiar with the 
likelihood of attacks on the websites they managed. Group H 
simply had their most expert members (H1, H3) identify the 
most likely threats by placing asterisks on the flipchart. Group 
I did similar. Group J had J1 and J2 (facilitators and also 
security experts) do the assessment. Group K successfully 
used a post-it approach, with very little facilitation, for the risk 
assessment; with separate dot-voting to identify the most 
likely and the most impactful threats.  
In summary, all the groups found effective ways to assign 
risk to each of the threats they identified. 
The benefit analysis outcomes from Threat Sales 
workshop are shown in column 4 of Table 3. They were also 
surprisingly satisfactory, given the lack of specific training 
given the group. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the developers in the 
groups had the necessary skills and insights required, and thus 
that the answer to RQ 5 is affirmative. 
VI. DISCUSSION  
As Section IV explains, Design-Based Research (DBR) 
has been used mostly in the field of education research. While 
the creation of an intervention in the field of Developer-
centred Security is arguably a form of education, we are not 
aware of other researchers using DBR in this field. In this 
research, as Section V shows, DBR has provided an effective 
basis for trialling, evaluating, and deducing theory from the 
use of an intervention.  
A. Outcomes from Workshops 
The workshops concentrated on two aspects of security: 
using Threat Assessment to help participants focus their 
security effort on the appropriate threats; and using Threat 
Sales to present security requirements as positive 
opportunities to product management. It was therefore 
encouraging that the results in Figure 4 show that all the 
groups completed the intervention with an understanding of 
Threat Assessment and Stakeholder Negotiation, and, in a 
large majority of cases, incorporated those techniques into 
their ways of working. For half the groups involved this 
represented a large improvement over their previous practice. 
Given the purpose of the new intervention package was to 
encourage others to use the package and lead sessions, it was 
encouraging that two companies did so; it was disappointing 
that a larger number had not got around to it after several 
months, even if they expressed intentions of doing so. 
B. Variation of Results with Different Situations 
We highlight some points of interest from the 
categorizations of impact in Table 4: 
The intervention was adopted most by medium sized 
companies: such companies will have latent security 
TABLE 4: IMPACT AVERAGED BY GROUP ATTRIBUTES 
 
All       Org. size Facilitation Sec. maturity Prod.mgr Facilitator   
Large Med. Small Dom. Listen. Peer High Med Low Yes No Mgr. Sec. Dev. 
Count in each category 8 3 3 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 
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expertise but no formal security function, making this 
intervention particularly useful for them. 
Sessions facilitated by managers appear more effective 
than those facilitated by developers or security specialists:  
This may reflect better training in facilitation-related skills 
given to managers; it may also reflect greater power amongst 
managers to introduce new techniques.  
The presence or absence of a product manager in the 
group had negligible effect on the adoption of Stakeholder 
Negotiation: This was a surprise. The author had expected a 
product manager would encourage emphasis and therefore 
improvements in this, but the results do not show that effect. 
The presence of a product manager did, however, encourage 
the incorporation of other assurance techniques.  
Peer-based learning appears as effective as more active 
forms of facilitation: This offers the possibility of modifying 
the intervention workshops to be entirely peer-to-peer 
learning; making fewer demands on future facilitators. 
Of course, given the sample size of 8 groups, these results 
are merely indicative and not statistically valid as indicators. 
C. Skills Not Associated with Developers 
Section V.E’s answer to RQ 5 was that, surprisingly, 
developers found it easy both to assess the impact and 
likelihood of successful threat activities; and to think up ways 
of ‘selling’ security improvements to Product Management.  
While we have no way of validating their results, we 
believe that their assessments will be sufficient for the 
purpose: 
• With risk assessment, the consequence of getting a risk 
assessment wrong is much less than the consequence of 
not doing it at all.  
• With sales, where Product Managers were present, they 
engaged very well with the process and found it valuable. 
This suggests that others may also find the results useful.  
We conclude that there is no need in future interventions 
to provide more sophisticated training in either risk 
assessment or sales; most teams will be able to carry out both 
workshops without it. 
D. Threats to Validity 
We have considered the following types of validity: 
Internal Validity: Were the measured improvements 
caused by the workshops? Since the majority of improvements 
were in areas directly addressed by the workshops (Figure 4), 
it is reasonable to assume a causal relationship here. 
Conclusion Validity: Can we derive convincing theory 
from the results? The Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.46 indicates 
only moderate agreement between developers, suggesting that 
the measurements depend more than we would like on the skill 
and bias of the coders: it was difficult to identify initial 
adoption of Assurance Techniques since the Entry interviews 
did not ask explicitly about techniques. The sample size of 8 
workshops is insufficient for a test of statistical significance; 
therefore, the results here should be taken as an indication 
rather than definite proof of the workshops’ effectiveness. 
Construct Validity: Does the experimental model reflect 
reality? The research measured the self-reported activities and 
knowledge; clearly it would be better to measure the resulting 
process or the security of the artefacts produced. 
Unfortunately, the latter is practically impossible in 
engagements of this kind, so this remains a limitation of this 
kind of study. A further limitation is the granularity of the 
adoption measurements used. Automatic Static Analysis, for 
example, could range from a simple pattern-based solution to 
a complex tool integrated into the CI system. Future studies 
might differentiate types of adoption. 
External Validity: How far can we generalize the results? 
Participant companies were self-selected; the variety of the 
teams involved suggests that the workshops will work in many 
situations, but this research provides an indication rather than 
proof.  
E. Future Work 
The package used in these trials has a practical limitation: 
it requires time input from a researcher to train the facilitators. 
This severely restricts its scalability to a wider audience of 
development teams, and hence the academic impact it can 
have.  
However, the success of the workshops as peer-to-peer 
exercises, where the facilitator only provided instructions, 
opens the possibility of a new version of the intervention that 
needs no direct training, and therefore can scale without limit.  
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Recall the research question for this work: RQ 1 “What 
aspects of an intervention to a software development team are 
effective at improving security, and why?” 
The trials showed that the intervention led to 
improvements in security process or understanding with all 
the groups who used it except the most security expert one. 
All three workshops were effective at helping improving 
security; developers proved adept even at risk assessment and 
creating positive representations of security improvements 
(Section VI.C). 
The intervention had most impact where the workshops 
were facilitated by managers (Section VI.B), and were  
adopted most by medium sized companies; those that will 
have latent security expertise but no formal security function.  
The findings from this project promise a new version of 
the package that can scale without limit and pave the way to 
the creation and trial of such a new package (Section VI.E). 
The lead author is currently working on a project to do exactly 
that.  
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